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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
IMPLIED EASEMENTS IN MARYLAND
Lane v. Flautt'
The complainants-appellees sought an injunction to re-
strain the respondents-appellants from erecting a structure
which would cut off light and air from the complainants'
property. The lower court granted the injunction; the re-
spondents appealed. Held: Cause remanded for amend-
ment of decree.
The parties were owners of adjacent lots on which were
located houses, each abutting the other at the dividing line
for a depth of twenty-two feet. For the remaining depth
of twelve feet there was a five-foot space between the
houses; the respondents owned the land underlying the
space. The structure forming the basis for this suit was to
be constructed in this space, which structure would block
a large window in the complainants' house and darken two
other windows facing an outset in the complainants' prop-
erty. In 1899 both properties were under the same owner-
ship but the ownership was severed during that year when
the lots were sold separately at a mortgage foreclosure sale.
The buildings on the properties were the same in 1899 as
at present.
It was held that the two properties were so arranged
that the complainants' property was necessarily dependent
for light and air on the other property and thus on sever-
ance of ownership there arose an easement for light and
air by implication as to the large window. The Court,
however, held that the easement did not cover the other
two windows. Since a space was provided for light on
their own side there was no necessary dependence on the
respondents' property to manifest an intention that their
light should come from that side.
The Court devoted only a small portion of its opinion to
the legal problem presented. The statements made in the
paragraph above constitute a paraphrase of the entire
discussion of the law. This seems unusual, as the particu-
lar problem was being raised for the first time in this state.
When a landowner uses one lot for the benefit of another
in such a way that the use would be an easement if the
properties were separately owned and the use were exer-
cised as a right, such use is known as a quasi-easement.2
16 A. (2d) 228 (Md. 1939). See also the same case on a second appeal
from the form of the trial court's decree under the opinion of the Court
of Appeals on the first appeal, Baltimore Daily Record, December 12,
1939.
"2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1272.
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Whether the quasi-easement will ripen into a real ease-
ment on the severance of the ownership in the lots is known
as the doctrine of implied easements.3 Two rules have
been developed to determine if an easement will arise. If
the quasi-dominant lot is sold first, an easement arises if it
is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property
granted.4 If the quasi-servient lot is sold first the ease-
ment is raised as an implied reservation and therefore will
be raised only in the case of strict necessity.5
In the opinion the Court used the word "necessary," but
did not qualify it with either of the words "strict" or
"reasonable." An examination of the facts clearly dis-
closes that the rule adopted was "reasonable necessity." If
the facts had revealed that the quasi-dominant lot was sold
first at the mortgage foreclosure it could be said that it was
on this basis that the Court applied the reasonable test;
but, there was no indication of which lot was sold first.
We can reject this reasoning on still another basis. The
principle underlying the two rules is, quite obviously,
found in the legal maxim that a deed will be construed
against the grantor. The application of one rule or the
other could not be based on this principle in the case under
discussion where the deeds were executed by a court officer.
The Court in all probability applied the "reasonable
necessity" test because it considered the sales as simul-
taneous. While there has been no case in Maryland de-
ciding that the "reasonable" rule should apply to concur-
rent sales, such a view prevails in this country and in
England,6 and it has been adopted in a Maryland dictum.'
It is true that the sales which were important in the in-
stant case were not, strictly speaking, simultaneous. Few
indeed would be the applications of this rule if it were
dependent upon the occurrence of actually concurrent
sales. It seems fit and proper, though, that the rule should
3 Ibid.
'Kilgour v. Ashcom, 5 H. & J. 82 (Md. 1820); McTavish v. Carroll, 7
Md. 352, 61 Am. Dec. 353 (1855) ; Cherry v. Stein, et al., 11 Md. 1 (1858);
Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1, 6 Am. Rep. 300 (1870); Oliver v. Hook, 47
Md. 301 (1877); Burns et al. v. Gallagher, et al., 62 Md. 462 (1884) ; Elia-
son v. Grove, 85 Md. 215, 36 A. 844 (1897) ; Dinneen v. The Corporation,
Etc., 114 Md. 589, 79 A. 1021 (1911) ; Duvall v. Ridout, 124 Md. 193, 93 A.
209 (1914) ; Allers v. Back, 130 Md. 499, 100 A. 781 (1917) ; McConihe v.
Edmondson, 157 Md. 1, 145 A. 215 (1929); Knight v. Mitchell, 154 Md.
102, 140 A. 74 (1927).
'Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251, 36 Am. Rep. 404 (1879); Lippincott
v. Harvey, 72 Md. 572, 19 A. 1041 (1890); Mancuso v. Riddlemoser Co.,
117 Md. 53, 82 A. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 84 (1911).
o Washburn, American Law of Easements and Servitudes (4th ed. 1885)
110.
*' Mitchell v. Seipel, supra n. 5.
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be applied to our case, where, presumably, the sales were
as nearly simultaneous as is practicable.
Doubtless the rules discussed above were developed to
assist the courts in determining the intention of the parties,
and to reduce litigation by preventing frivolous claims.
They have been criticized on the basis of arbitrariness.'
An examination of these objections may be profitable, re-
membering that the fundamental task is to determine the
intention of the partiesY A problem arises only when the
intention has not been expressed; when the intention must
be gleaned from the facts and circumstances surrounding
the transaction.
Walsh has taken the position that American Courts, in
general, do not follow the present English rule that ease-
ments arising by implied reservation must be, in fact, ac-
tually necessary to the use of the land retained for the pur-
poses intended. He attacks the English rule because it
ignores the fact that easements created by reservation turn
on exactly the same principle as easements by implied
grant, that such a rule of construction can have no applica-
tion until there is a real doubt. "Where the intent is clear
there is no room for construction."1  Reduced to its lowest
terms, his position is that there can be situations where the
intent is clear, but where the easement is not actually
necessary for the use of the property as intended. Some
such situation may arise, but it is difficult to imagine. If in
any case it could be said that the easement was not actually
necessary for the use of the property as intended, there
would, in all probability, be a doubt as to the intention of
the parties. The doubts, in justice and on authority, should
be resolved against the person who wrote the instrument.
If and when the case comes up the Court could, without
disturbing the rule, say that it did not apply, as rules of
construction are only applicable to situations where the
intent is not clear. No rule, especially one of construction,
should be blindly followed without due regard for its pur-
pose. The rule of "strict necessity" does serve to state the
law clearly and concisely. If it is not perfect, it is so nearly
so that convenience can demand its acceptance."
8 Walsh, Property (2d ed. 1915) 611; Tiffany, op. cit. supra n. 2, 1287,
Sec. 363.
'Note language of instant case; see cases cited in notes 4 & 5.
Supra n. 8.
"Some states, especially Pennsylvania, do not use the "strict neces-
sity" doctrine; it is on these cases and on the language of others Walsh
bases his opinion, supra n. 8.
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The English rule was specifically adopted in Maryland
in the case of Mitchell v. Seipel,12 and the case is supported
by two later decisions as well as by various Maryland
dicta.13
Walsh has suggested that the term, "reasonable neces-
sity," as a requirement for easements by implied grant
should be changed to "add value" to the property granted. 4
It is submitted that the suggested term is no more satisfac-
tory than the one now used; it is neither more definite nor
more descriptive and is not entirely accurate because ease-
ments have been refused where they would have added
value to the property. 5 It could be argued that "reasonable
necessity" is not accurate and was rejected in McConihe v.
Edmondson."6 That rejection, however, was unnecessary.
The Court allowed an easement of way where it was the
only convenient approach to the property, but the Court
could have said, without disturbing the thought, that the
way was "reasonably necessary" for the use of the prop-
erty granted and thus would have been consistent with
the language of the other Maryland decisions."
According to Mr. Tiffany the presence of "necessity"
may be indicative of an intention to grant the easement,
and the lack of it may be indicative of the lack of an in-
tention to grant the easement, but the requirement should
not be controlling.'8  Certainly, a court would not allow
the rule to be controlling if the intention were otherwise
clear. The language of the decisions, in general, shows
a realization that the rule is one of construction and could
not control in such a case.'" Furthermore, the case of
McConihe v. Edmondson is direct authority for the propo-
sition, even though in that particular case it was unneces-
sary to discard the rule. Here, too, it is difficult to con-
ceive of a situation where the intention could be clear
without the easement being "reasonably necessary" for the
convenient enjoyment of the property. Especially is this
true if the term is clearly understood.
The Maryland Court has not attempted to define the
requirement, but the Indiana Court has stated it very sat-
isfactorily, and in accord with the Maryland decisions:
12 Supra n. 5.
Is Supra notes 4 & 5.
14 Walsh, op. cit. supra n. 8, 611.
15 Duvall v. Ridout, Allers v. Back, Knight v. Mitchell, all supra n. 4.
10 Supra n. 4.
2"Ibid.




"The degree of necessity is to be determined rather
by the permanency, apparent purpose, and adaptibil-
ity of the disposition made by the owner during the
unity of title, than by considering whether a possible
use can be made of the parcel granted, after a dis-
continuance of the right formerly exercised over the
other.2"
"The reasonable application of the doctrine as we
deduce it from the authorities, however, leads to the
general conclusion that if the service imposed on one,
during the unity of possession of the parcels of land,
was of a character looking to permanency, and the
discontinuance of such service would obviously in-
voke an actual and substantial rearrangement of that
part of the estate in whose favor the service was im-
posed, to the end that it might be as comfortably en-
joyed as before then such a degree of reasonable
necessity would seem to exist as would raise an impli-
cation that the use was to be continued. 21
It would seem that "reasonable necessity" and "strict
necessity" are accurate and proper terms for describing
what motivates courts in allowing or disallowing easements
by implication.
SPECIFIC RESTITUTION IN EQUITY OF
CONVERTED STOCKS AND BONDS
Farmer v. O'Carroll1
At the time of the transaction in question the plaintiff-
appellant was a widow of about 63 years with an estate of
about $180,000. She delivered to defendants-appellees, the
treasurer of a college and the college corporation, $135,350
worth of Liberty Bonds and signed a written agreement to
the effect that the bonds were an absolute gift by her to
the college corporation, but that the corporation was to
pay the plaintiff the interest received from the bonds until
"0 John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582,
2 N. E. 188, 192 (1885).
2 1 Ibid., 2 N. E. 193.
1 162 Md. 431, 160 A. 12 (1932).
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